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The subject matter of this book is the nature and mode of existence of institu-
tional social reality, i.e. of nation-states, money, corporations, clubs and other
social institutions. In the ﬁrst part of the book Searle proposes an ontology of
social institutions, in the second part he applies this theory to speciﬁc, mostly
philosophical questions such as the nature of power, the status of human rights
and the signiﬁcance of rationality for life in human society. Many of the ideas
presented in this book can already be found in Searle’s earlier work The Con-
struction of Social Reality (1995). The new book focuses on the relevance of so-
cial ontology for classical problems of philosophy, adding to the topics treated in
The Construction of Social Reality a discussion of the role of human language in
the construction of institutional reality and a discussion of free will, rationality,
power, and human rights.
Searle’s theory consists of a description and analysis of the structure of social
institutions. The main thesis is that humans possess “the capacity to impose
functions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform
the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure. The performance of the
function requires that there be a collectively recognized status that the person
or object has, and it is only in virtue of that status that the person or object
can perform the function in question” (7). Status functions result from rules
constitutive for a practice which determine when x has to count as y in context
C. They, for example, determine when a movement of an object counts as a legal
knight move in the game of chess or under which institutional conditions Obama
counts as the president of the United States. Rules of this kind make up the
structure of institutional social reality.
Searle maintains that all status functions are created by speech acts (oral
or written) of a special type which he calls “declarations”. These speech acts
“change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus bringing
that state of affairs into existence” (13). Declarations, i.e. linguistic acts rep-
resenting special intentional states, create status functions, and thus language
assumes a central role in the construction of social institutions.1 Declarations
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bring about all of social institutional reality (with the exception of language it-
self). Prelinguistic intentional states cannot do this (69). According to Searle,
this circumstance guarantees that status functions carry “deontic powers”, that
is rights, duties, obligations and so on. Searle thinks that language (for example
the use of declarations) necessarily involves social commitments. The alleged
necessity of these commitments derives from the social character of the commu-
nication situation, the conventional character of the expression devices and the
intentionality of speakers’ meaning (80). Social commitment is insolubly tied to
the performance of speech acts: an assertion commits the speaker to its truth, a
promise commits its maker to keeping the promise.
Searle now claims that his analysis of institutional reality helps to elucidate
important philosophical problems of the freedom of the will, of human rational-
ity, of power and of human rights. He assumes that there are two types of rea-
sons for action, desire-based reasons and desire-independent reasons. Desire-
independent reasons are commitments, obligations, rights and so on. They are
reasons for an action even if there is no desire for that action: “it is a pecu-
liarity of human beings that they have the capacity to create and act on desire-
independent reasons for action” (127/8). Desire-independent reasons can ground
a desire and cause it, even though this is logically not inevitable nor always the
case. Reasons, according to Searle, normally do not constitute the causally suf-
ﬁcient condition for our decisions and actions. In this sense, there is an “expe-
rienced causal gap” between causes of actions and actions. Reasons lead to an
inclination to execute a decision, they do not force it. In the philosophical tradi-
tion, this gap was called ‘freedom of the will’. Without our conscious experience
of this gap, that is without freedom of will, institutional facts are meaningless.
The institutional structure provides desire-independent reasons for action. The
recognition of the deontic character of institutions amounts to the recognition of
desire-independent reasons for action.
Searle tries to account for social institutional reality and for human ratio-
nality in terms of the concept of power, using an analysis of the concept of
power which is very similar to Max Weber’s. He distinguishes between gen-
eral deontic power exercised by the performance of speech acts, power as social
pressure (“background power”), and political power which is connected with the
permanent threat of physical force. Deontic power also has to do with rights,
as rights always imply obligations. Searle extends his discussion to universal
human rights, and points out that their justiﬁcation cannot be ethically neutral.
In the short concluding chapter (200–202) Searle poses the question of the
possible relevance of his ontological account for research in the social sciences.
Surprisingly frank, he concedes: “I guess the short answer is that I don’t really
know” (200). Not quite consistent with this admission is when he adds some-
what later that the knowledge of the basic ontology of a discipline deepens the
understanding of issues in this discipline, implying that the knowledge of so-
cial ontology deepens the understanding of social sciences. He substantiates
propriate to say that speech creates status functions and with it institutional reality. Such a
distinction between language and speech could, I think, clarify many of Searle’s claims.14 Axel Bühler
this statement with, amongst others, the following considerations: (1) It would
be a mistake to treat money or other social institutions as if they were natural
phenomena like those studied in the natural sciences. They should rather be
regarded as products of massive, socially shared fantasy. Institutions disinte-
grate when people lose conﬁdence in them. (2) All diverse human institutions
have a common structure: repeated applications of speciﬁc linguistic representa-
tions (especially of declarations) distribute “deontic powers”. Therefore different
branches of the social sciences, such as sociology and economics, should not be
viewed as if they dealt with fundamentally different subject matters. The theses
of the fragile nature of institutional social reality and of the unity of the social
sciences, however, do not seem to be closely connected to social ontology. They
have, in fact, been brought forward by others without an appeal to ontological
claims. So it does not appear that social ontology necessarily contributes to a
deeper understanding of the social sciences.
This often quite repetitive book has as its main aim reconstructing and re-
formulating philosophical concepts and problems within an ontology of social
institutions. It does not address the epistemological status of the social ontology
proposed. So this book does not try to answer questions such as: What kind
of knowledge can be provided by social ontology? What is the relation between
social ontology and research in the social sciences? I think the lack of discussion
of these questions constitutes the fundamental ﬂaw of this book. Social ontology
seems to be an empty exercise if it cannot be fruitfully related to problems of
the social sciences. Furthermore, the adequacy of Searle’s reconstruction of the
philosophical problems itself hinges on the answers to these questions. For how
can Searle’s reconstruction of the problems of freedom of will, human rational-
ity, power and human rights be assessed if the epistemological status of Searles
social ontology is left open? I will brieﬂy discuss how Searle deals with the ques-
tions of the status of social ontology and of its relation to the social sciences.
What kind of knowledge can be provided by social ontology? As already re-
marked, the social ontology of Searle consists of the description of the structure
of social institutions. Such structural descriptions, according to Searle at an-
other place,2 are not empirical hypotheses, but have conceptual nature. They
analyze concepts in an a priori fashion, they are no ordinary empirical anthro-
pological generalizations. A conceptual analysis, Searle thinks, has not only con-
ceptual signiﬁcance, but also some empirical import: The structures exhibited in
the conceptual analysis can be confronted with our intuitions about institutional
structures of a speciﬁc society. It can, however, not be tested by confronting con-
sequences of the analysis with observable facts. Searle assumes that institu-
tional reality possesses a conceptual or even “logical” structure (6), accessible to
conceptual analysis. But there are at least three objections to this assumption.
First, according to it there is a priori knowledge about society, immune to revi-
sion and empirical falsiﬁcation. This is very questionable. Furthermore, Searle’s
assumption amounts to the separation of reality in two realms, one realm of re-
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ality being accessible to conceptual analysis and one realm of facts accessible by
the methods of the empirical sciences. It leads to an ontological dualism which
Searle justly tries to avoid in favour for an ontological monism (3–4). Third,
Searle’s assumption is an obstacle to the further development of one of the most
promising ideas in the book, namely that language plays a central role in the
creation of social institutions. This idea can be elaborated only by detailed em-
pirical comparisons with prelinguistic communication systems, not with a priori
considerations about the structure of language.
What are the tasks of research in the social sciences and how are they re-
lated to the tasks of social ontology? Research in the social sciences deals with
the question which norms or rules are accepted (or valid) in certain social for-
mations, social ontology consists of an analysis of the “deontic powers” of status
functions. How does the empirical ascertainment of the validity of norms or
rules in a society differ from the descriptions of status functions given by social
ontology? Research in the social sciences is concerned with structural descrip-
tions of various social formations, social ontology deals with the description and
analysis of social structure. How do social scientiﬁc descriptions of structures
differ from those offered by social ontology? Searle does not attempt to answer
these questions nor does he show any awareness that answers to these ques-
tions are of crucial importance for his enterprise of a monistic and naturalistic
account of social reality.
I conclude: The relation of social ontology to the social sciences appears to be
a subject matter which Searle has not considered in a serious way. And Searle’s
view of the epistemological status of social ontology seems to be inadequate.
Searle’s book does contain some interesting ideas on the contribution of linguis-
tic communication (by way of declarations) to social structure. Nevertheless,
given that he considers them to be of merely conceptual nature, Searle cannot
connect them to biological and social-psychological research. And given his dis-
attention to problems of the social sciences, he does not succeed in applying
these ideas to empirical problems of explaining social structure and its evolu-
tion. Therefore, I think that Searle’s book will disappoint anyone who wants to
know more about the relevance of social ontology for the empirical sciences.
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